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KXOREA
SECOND GWANGJU REGIONAL PROJECT (LOAN 1758-KO1
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
PREFACE
This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Second Gwangju
Regional Project (Loan 1758-KO) for which a loan of US$65 million was ,-proved
by the Board on September 11, 1979. Under Subsidiary Loan Agreements, the
proceeds of the loan were on-lent to City Governments of Gwangju, Mogpo, and
Yeosu, the Government of Goheung County and the National Federation of
Fisheries Cooperatives. The on-lent funds carried the same term and grace
period as the Bank loan but at an interest rate which was 0.05% per annum
higher than the Bank loan rate. The loan closed on June 30, 1985, and the
final disbursement was made in December 1985. Due to cost savings under the
project resulting from a substantial devaluation of the won, US$12.78 million
of the loan funds were cancelled at the Government's request in October 1984
and another US$1.02 million were cancelled in December 1985.
The PCR was prepared by staff of the Infrastructure Operations
Division, Country Department II, Asia Regional Office, based on documents
contained in the project file. Comments were received from the Ministry of
Construction, the agency primarily responsible for project implementation.
This PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED).
The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower for comments and they are attached to
the Report as Annex 10.
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PROJECT COWPLETION REPORT
CDURTRY
NWlE OF PROJECT
(LOAN/CREDIT NO.}
BSIC DATA SHEET
KEY PROJECT DATA
Appraisal Actuat or Actual as X of
Item Exoectation Current Estimate AoraisaL Estimate
Total Project Costs (USS million) 154.8 148.7 96.1X
Loan Amomnt (USS million) 65.0 51.2 78.8X
Cofinancing-Total (USS million)
ADAB s
CIDA =
KfW 
NORAD 
MA
SIDA
Date Physical Coamponents Canpleted 12/31/83 12/31/85
Proportion completed by that date (X) 1002 1002
Economic Rote of Return 23X 122
Institutional Performance Satisfactory Satisfactory
CUULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
F80 FY81 83 Y fY84 FY85 FY86
Appraisal Estimate (USS million) 1.50 16.50 41.30 63.20 56.00
Actual (USS million) 0.00 4.06 11.81 24.69 46.85 50.77 51.20
Actual as X of Appraisal (2)
Date of Final Disbursement: December 30 1°85
PROJECT DATES
Original Actual as X of
Plan Revisions Actut Oriainal Ptan
First Nention in Files 4/72 10/g;
Negotiations 6/25 29/79
Board Approval 9/11/79
Signing (Credit Agreement Date) 9/27/79
Effectiveness 2/15/80
Closing Date 6/30/84 6/30/85
* Use PROGRAM in the case of SAL audits.
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STAFF INPUTS
(staff weeks)
FY77 FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 F3y§ FY84 FY85 FY86 FY87 FYa8 FY89
TOTAL
Identification/
Preparation 0.3 39.6 64.0
103.9
Appraisal 131.1
131.1
Negotiations 17.2 24.1
41.3
Supervision 27.3 32.4 23.7 20.4 12.4 5.2 0.2 12.2
133.8
Subtotal 0.3 39.6 212.3 51.4 32.4 23.7 20.4 12.4 5.2 0.2 12.2
410.1
fMlSSIOM DATA
Date No. of Specializations Performance Types of
(mo./yr.) Persons Represented Ratina Tren Problem
Identffication 12/76 2 EC EG
Preparation 3/78 4 2 EG FS US
Preappraisal 7/78 7 2 EG FS 2US TS FA
Appraisal 10/78 9 2EG 2FS US 2FA A S -
Post-Apprafsat 2/79 5 2 EG 2FS A -
Supervision I 10/79 4 EG FA A EC 1 1 F
Supervision II 5/80 6 EG FA A 3EC 1 1 F T
Supervision III 8/80 5 3EG FA FC 2 1 F T
Supervision IV 4/81 3 EG 2EC 2 2 F
Supervision V 9/81 2 EG EC 2 2 F
Supervision VI 1/82 2 EG EC 2 2 F
Supervision VII 5/82 2 EG EC 2 1 F
Supervision VIII 11/82 3 EG EC FA 1 2 F
Supervision IX 10/83 2 EG EC 1 2 F T
Supervision X 7/84 1 EC 1 2 F
Sunoervision XI 11/84 1 EC 1 2
Supervision XII 4/85 2 EC EG 1 2
Completion 11/86 3 EC FA RA -
EC a Economist, EG = Engineer, FS = Fishery Specialist, US u Urban Specialist
TS a Transport Specialist, FA a Financial Analyst, A = Architect, S a Secretary
RA a Research Asststent
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OTHER PROJECT DATA
Borrower: Goverrnent of Korea
Executing Agency: Ministry of Construction
Foltlo-On Pr.uects:
Name Jeonju Regional Project
Credit Number LW 2388-KO
Amnomt (US$ million) 60.0
Approval Date 13 March 84
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KOREA
SECOND GWANGJU REGIONAL PROJECT (LOAN 1758-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
HIGHLIGHTS
1. The Second Gwangju Rerional Project (Ln. 1758-KO), like its
predecessor, the Secondary Cities Regional Project (Loan 1070-K0), was
designed to support the Government's strategy for reducing regional imbalances
in the country's economic development through industrial decentralization,
development of secondary cities and increased primary sector productivity in
the Gwangju Region, one of the poorest, least developed regions of the
country. Specifically, the project aimed at. (a) promoting industrialization
in the region's cities in order to expand employment opportunities; (b)
improving living conditions in the urban areas; and (c) increasing the income-
earning opportunities of the region's island population through improved
transport linkages and fisheries activities.
2. The project as appraised included the provision of: (a) housing
estae ,- in the major regional cities of Gwangju, Mogpo and Yeosu totalling
nearly 3,950 serviced residential plots, some with expandable core houses; (b)
about 200 ha of serviced industrial land in Gwangju and Mogpo; (c)
improvements to water supply systems in Mogpo, Yeosu and the Narodo Islands;
(d) construction of two bridges to link Dolsan and Jindo Islands to the
mainland, improvements to 1.9 km of commercial road in Yeosu and ferry service
between Narodo Island and the mainland; (e) an aquaculture development program
to enhance fishermen's incomes and a shrimp storage facility at Imja Island;
and (f) technical assistance (para. 3.2) A Bank loan for US$65 million was
approved by the Board in September 1979 to assist in financing the project's
total estimated cost of W 75.1 billion (US$154.8 million).
3. The project was initiated at a time when the Korean economy had
begun to deteriorate after the oil price increases of 1979. Higher than
expected inflation led to project cost increases while the tight budgetary
situation, of both the central government and the project cities, resulted in
delays which could not be made up during the subsequent implementation period
(paras. 4.2 and 4.3). The project was therefore completed two years later
than expected, in December 1985 rather than December 1983 as originally
planned, and loan closing had to be extended by one year, from June 30, 1984
to June 30, 1985. Actual project costs totalled W 104.8 billion (US$141.1
million). While the project experienced costs overruns in won terms, costs
were less than expected in US dollar terms due to the devaluation of the won.
As a result, savings of US$13.8 million of the loan amount were cancelled.
4. The project underwent several changes during implementation, the
major changes being as follows: (a) the design of the Dolsan Bridge was
changed from a steel box girder suspension bridge to a itore expensive cable
stay suspension bridge; (b) a separate water supply system was added to the
- vi -
Gwangju industrial estate due to delays in expanding the Gwangju City system;
(c) the Hogpo industrial estate and related works, cancelled due to
projections of higher than expected costs and sluggish demand, were replaced
with other high priority investments, i.e., land readjustment scheme and a
drainage improvement, also for Mogpo; and (d) the aquaculture development
component for the production of laver, an ecible seaweed, was reduced due to
overproduction and a consequent lack of farmer enthusiasm for further
investment (para. 4.5).
5. The project succeeded in accomplishing its objective of providing
industrial employment opportunities through the construction of the Gwangju
industrial estate which has been fully sold out and is expected to employ
about 10,000 workers (para. 6.2). The water supply components have improved
living conditions in the area while housing provided under the project has
increased the housing supply in the project cities. Project investments to
establish a road link between the mainland and Jindo Island, noted for its
coastline and beaches, should enhance the Island's tourism potential,
particularly in view of the rise in domestic tourism expected as a result of
increasing incomes (para. 6.5). Cable stay bridge technology was transferred
to Korean contractors through the construction of the Jindo and Dolsan Bridges
(4.14). The project did not, however, contribute to development of
aquaculture in the region due to the major cut-back in the aquaculture
component. Overall, the major project components, accounting for 77% of total
projects costs, have weighted average economic return of 12%, rather lower
than the 23% return estimated at appraisal due to cost increases resulting
from the longer than expected implementation period (paras. 6.6 and 6.7).
6. While the project is estimated to have accounted for less than 10%
of total government resources invested in the Gwangju Region during the
project period, it did play a major role in financing investments in the
project cities, which are constrained by their limited revenue base and lack
of access to ex:ternal financing (para. 7.3). Implementation of the project
was largely hampered by two factors: first, some project components were
identified somewhat late in the project preparation process and may not have
been sufficiently prepared; and second, the need to provide counterpart funds
for all project components simUltaneously strained the local government
budgets. In the future, regional development project should also consider
formulating an institutional framework for identifying and implementing
projects which could include:
(a) a regionalized allocation of central government resources, with
regional breakdowns of annual budgets; and
(b) mechanisms by which local governments (whether provincial, city or
county) could themselves implement the regional projects. This
might require development of a financing scheme, e.g., a Regional
Development Fund, and, where the local governments lack the
technical capabilities for project implementation, the appointment
of a central government agency such as the Ministry of
Construction to carry out works on behalf of the local government
or the establishment of a separate agency, e.g., a Regional
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Development Corpovation, to assist the local governments where
necessary.
The development of such an institutional framework would be a medium term
objective to be achieved through a series of regional development projects,
starting off with selected investments carried out in the target region
through a central government agency along the lines of the regional
development projects in Korea.
KOREA
SECOND GWANCJU REGIONAL PROJECT (LOAN 1758-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Gwanaiu Region
1.1 The Gwangju Region, consisting primar.ly of Jeonra Nam
Province,l_/ is one of the poorer regions in Korea. Located in the
southwestern part of the country, the province has traditionally been
an agricultural center, and did not benefit from the rapid industrial
development of the late 1960s and 1970s which was concentrated around
Seoul, in the northwest, and Pusan and Taegu, in the southeast.
Agriculture and fisheries continue to be the main economic activities
of the province, and in 1978, when t's Second Gwangju Regional Project
was being prepared, per capita Gross Regional Product (GRP) in Jeonra
Nam Province was about 80% of the national average and 60% of the GRP
of Seoul.
1.2 In 1980, the province had a population of 3.8 million or 10%
of Korea's total population. Its urban population of 1.2 million was
spread out in four cities: Gwangju (population 727,600, the fifth
largest city in Korea), Mogpo (population 221,814), Yeosu (population
160,988) and Suncheon (population 114,241). The urbanization rate in
the province in 1980 was 32% compared to 57% for Korea as a whole.
Between 1975 and 1980, the province's urban population rose from 1.0
million to 1.2 million, while the total population dropped from 4.0
million to 3.8 million owing to a general movement of the population
from the poorer provinces to Seoul.
B. Proiect Background
1.3 The Government of Korea has been concerned about the regional
distribution of economic growth in the country since the 1960s. To
address the perceived imbalance in development, in 1971 the Ministry
of Construction (MOC) issued the First Comprehensive National Land
Development Plan (1972-81) which provided a blue print for future
infrastructure investment in the country. The Plan divided the nation
into eight regions and outlined the broad investment priorities for
each region. Detailed investment plans were prepared for three of the
regions with the help of foreign assistance: the United Nations
1J The report uses the McCune-Reischauer System for spelling Korean
place names to be consistent with the appraisal report. Under the
alternative Ministry of Education System which is now more widely used
by the Government, "Jeonra Nam Province" would be spelt "Cholla Nam
Province" and "Gwangju Region" spelt "Kwar,gju Region."
S -~~~~~~~~~~~~2-
Development Programme (UNDP) provided financing for the Gwangju and
Taebag plans while the Jeonju plan was funded by a grant from the
Canadian Government. The Gwangju Regional Study, undertaken by Robert
R. Nathan Associates during 1974-75, provided the basis for this
project as well as its predecessor, the Korea Secondary Cities
Regional Project (Loan 1070-KO), approved In 1975. The Secondary
Cities Project financed housing sites and services in Gwangju, Mogpo
and Yeosu Cities, a fishery harbor complex in Yeosu City, a market in
Suncheon City, roads in Mogpo and Yeosu Cities, and technical
assistance. Utilizing savings under the loan due to a significant
devaluation of the won in 1974, funding for several additional
components, including a water supply system for Yeosu City and several
studies, was also provided under the project. In line with the
project's institutional objectives, a Gwangju Regional Development
Unit (GRDU) was established under the Ministry of Construction (MOC)
to implement the project. The GRDU was subsequently incorporated into
the MOC's Gwangju Regional Construction Office (GRCO).2_/ The
Secondary Cities Project was completed in 1980 at a total cost of W 15
billion (US$25 million), somewhat higher than the estimated cost of
W 10 billion at appraisal due to the additional costs of components
added during implementation. A Project Performance Audit Report for
the Secondary Cities Project (No. 5609) found that the project had had
mixed results and that its impact was somewhat less than expected at
appraisal. However, the audit found that institutional arrangements
under the project were quite successful and deserved to be replicated
in other regions of Korea, but cautioned that the projec'- should not
be emulated as a model for planning and designing regional development
programs. According to the PPAR, rather than constituting a cohesive
set of investment that together would foster regional development, the
project evolved into a collection of subprojects tied together by the
fact that the same element was being repeated in differenct cities,
and by the physical proximity of some of the components.
II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL
A. Project Preparation
2.1 In November 1976, after the Secondary Cities Regional Project
had begun, MOC suggested some additional components for Bank financing
in the Gwangju Region, based on the findings of the Robert Nathan
Study. The proposed investments addressed the needs of both the urb-%n
areas, through industrial development and infrastructure investments
in the four major cities, and the rural areas, through agricultural
storage and fishery development. Feasibility studies for these
investments were funded under the Secondary Cities Project and carried
out by consultants who were already providing technical assistance to
2J The office was first named the Jeonra Nam Regional Construction
Office (JNRCO) , then subsequently renamed the GRCO. The GRCO was
abolished and its operations integrated with MOC's Iri Regional
Construction Office (IRCO) in Jeonra Bug Province during the
government reorganization of 1981.
GRDU under the Secondary Cities Project. The feasibility studies were
started in September 1977 and completed in June 1978. A Bank =
evaluation of the studies found them unsatisfactory since engineering '
design work had been carried out without adequately establishing the :
need for and appropriate scale of each component through an analysis
of demand and alternative design solutions. As a result, the Bank had
to provide additiona;A resources during project preparation and
appraisal to compensate for the shortcomings of the feasibility
studies.
2.2 During project preparation, changes were made in the
composition of components. First, housing components were identified U
in Gwangju, Mogpo and Yeosu in response to the acute housing shortage
in the region and the favorable experience with housing estates under
the Secondary Cities Project. Second, additional water supply
components were identified fur Gwangju and Yeosu. But due to the
priority of these investments, they were for the most part initiated
immediately, with funding under the First Water Supply Project (Ln.
2072-KO) for the investments in Gwe.ngju and under the first regional
project for water source development, transmission and treatment
facilities in Yeosu. The Yeosu distribution system was, however,
financed under the Second Regional Project. Third, the fishery
development component was determined not to be economically feasible
and was therefore replaced by an aquaculture developmetn component and
by components for development of Narodo, a pair of islands off the
mainland with good potentional for tourism and fisheries. This
reflected the Government's keen interest in assisting the less
developed coastal and island areas in the region. The preparation of
these additional components was carried out by GRDU with the
assistance of local consultants and Bank staff.
B. Proiect Anpraisal
2.3 The project was appraised in October/November 1978. The
main issues raised with the Government at appraisal were the
following:
(a) Inclusion of Narginal Components: The Government was eager
to include components to develop the poorer island and
coastal areas of the province primarily for political
reasons. However, most of the components identified for
this target group were found to be economically and
financially not feasible. The Bank mission proposed
redesigning some components (i.e., ferry terminals instead
of bridges for Narodo), identified new components (the
aquaculture component to replace several fisheries-related
components) and included technical assistance for an Island
Development Study to address the needs of the coastal areas;
and
(b) Design Standards For Housing Estates: The Bank's primary
objective in the housing sector was to construct affordable
housing for the urban poor without government subsidies so
that the program could be replicated on a larger scale
nationwide. In order to make the units affordable to the
low income group, the Bank proposed expandable core houses
one of 9 pyong (py) 3J, about 30 sq m, and another of 12
py, about 40 sq m. The Government felt that these were too
small and preferred to construct apartments with a larger
unit size even if government subsidies were required to make
them affordable to the target group.
Other issues raised by the mission were: (a) the financial strain of
the project on the city budgets (especially Yeosu); (b) full cost
recovery for the industrial estate; (c) the financial status of the
Mogpo Water Bureau; and (d) the need for an urban plan for Dolsan
Island.
2.4 The main issues raised during the Bank review of the project
following appraisal were as follows:
(a) Status of Proiect Prenaration: The Yeosu and Narodo water
supply components and the acquaculture component were either
redesigned or identified late in the project (during
preappraisal/appraisal) and were considered not fully
prepared; and
(b) Coordination Between Different Operations Within the Bank:
Timely provision of water to the Gwangju industrial and
housing estates depended upon the timing of the Bank's
Secondary Cities Water Supply Project which wa.s being
prepared simultaneously, while an Agricultural Marketing
Project was being prepared for implementation by the
National Federation of Fishery Cooperatives (NFFC), also the
implementing agency for the aquaculture component. Concern
was expressed over the NFFC's financial situation and it was
feared that implementation of a separate Bank project might
undermine efforts to improve NFFC's financial performance.
2.5 The Bank agreed to a post-appraisal mission (in February
1979) to finalize the aquaculture component with the participation of
staff preparing the Agricultural Marketing Project. Although the
mission was not completely satisfied with NFFC and did recognize it
may complicate later efforts under the Marketing Project, it was
decided to proceed with the acquaculture component because of its
importance to the project and its small size relative to NFFC's total
operations. The Bank also included a covenant in the Loan Agreement
requiring timely provision of water for the industrial and housing
estates.
3j The pyong (py), a Korsan unit of measuring area, is equal to
3.307 sq m.
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III. TEHE PR0JMC
A. Project Obiectives
3.1 In order to promote development in the Gwangju Region, the
project aimed at: (a) promoting industrialization in the region's
cities to expand employment opportunities; (b) improving living
conditions in the urban areas; and (c) increasing the income-earning
opportunities of the region's island population through improved
transport linkages and fisheries activities.
B. Proiect DescriRtion
3.2 The project, as appraised, consisted of the following
components:
(a) Housing (US$44.6 millior.): Provision of nearly 3,950
serviced residential plots in the cities of Gwangju, Mogpo
and Yeosu, with expandable core-houses designed mostly for
low-income families.
(b) Industrial Estates (US$64.7 million): Provision of about
200 ha of serviced industrial land in Gwangju and Mogpo to
accomodate 16,000 to 20,000 employees.
(c) Water SuRply (US$13.4 million): Improvements to water
supply systems in Mogpo, Yeosu and Narodo including
transmission, treatment, and distribution and operations.
(d) Transportation (US$19.5 million): Construction of two
bridges to link the islands of Dolsan and Jindo to the
mainland and improvements to a 1.9 km commercial road in
Yeosu and ferry service between Narodo and the mainland.
(e) Fisheries (US$7.0 million): Provision of a shrimp storage
facility and an aquaculture development program aimed at
enhancing fishermen's incomes.
(f) Technical Assistance (US$5.6 million): Provision of
assistance for regional planning, including an island
development study as well as aquaculture development, water
supply system operation and management, and preparation of a
third regional project.
3.3 With the exception of the aquaculture development program
which was implemented by NFFC, project design and construction were
carried out by HOC. Overall project coordination was carried out
through MOC's Regional Planning Division in Seoul, while review of
detailed designs, procurement and construction supervision were
carried out by MOC's regional offices (GRCO and then IRCO). Gwangju,
Mokpo and Yeosu Cities were responsible for land acquisition,
financing and operation and maintenance (upon completion) of the
housing, industrial estate, water supply, and Yeosu commercial road
components.
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3.4 The total project cost was estimated at W 7..l billion (US$
154.8 million). A Bank loan of US$65 million was provided to cover
the estimated foreign exchange requirements of the project (42% of
total project costs), with the balance of financing to be provided by
the cities (27%), central government budget funds (13%), the Korea
Housing Bank (13%), the Korea Development Bank (3%) and the National
Federation of Fishery Cooperatives (2%). About US$46 million of the
Bank loan was on-lent to Gwangju City, Mogpo City, Yeosu City, Goheung
County Government and NFCC. Signing of Subsidiary Loan Agreements
between the Ministry of Finance and the local governments and NFFC was
a condition of loan effectiveness.
C. Project Processin8
3.5 The loan was negotiated in June 1979, approved by the Bank's
Board on September 11, 1979, signed on September 27, 1979 and became
effective on February 15, 1980.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
A. Project Start-up
4.1 The economic situation in Korea deteriorated just as project
implementation was ueginning. The Korean economy, which had been
averaging real GNP growth of over 10% per annum during the 1970s,
entered into a recession in the second half of 1979 as a result of
increased oil prices and the resulting slowdown of economic growth
worldwide. The annual growth rates of nominal and real GNP for 1976
to 1985 are presented in Chart 1. Real GNP growth dropped from 9.7%
per annum in 1978, to 6.6% in 1979 and to -6.6% in 1980. Both local
and central government revenues, which had been growing at over 10%
per annum in real terms during the 1970s, experienced negative growth
in 1980. Wholesale prices, which had been increasing at around 10%
per annum, showed an annual increase of 19% in 1979, 39% in 1980 and
20% in 1981. On the other hand, land p- .ces which had been increasing
in real terms during the 1970s began to stabilize, reducing the
attractiveness of land as an investment. Land price increases in the
medium-sized cities in Korea averaged well over 20% per annum in the
late 1970s, peaking at 59% per annum or over 45% in real terms in
1978. However, Government intervention and economic recession reduced
the growth in land prices which fell to an annual increase of only 15%
(or about -4% in real terms) in medium-sized cities in 1979 to 14%
(about -35% in real terms) in 1980 and to 9% (about -12% in real
terms) in 1981. The annual growth rates of land prices, the GNP
deflator and wholesale prices are compared in Chart 2.
4.2 The worsening economic situation had a negative effect on
project start-up. The drop in central government revenues and high
inflation led to a tightenning of central government expenditures.
Detailed engineering for the housing and industrial estates components
was temporarily suspended in 1979/80 when the Economic Planning Board
dropped this activity from the 1980 government budget on the grounds
that it should be funded by the local governments. Central government
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funding was eventually restored and detailed engineering was completed
in mid-1980. Budget difficulties also resulted in longer construction
periods for the Jindo and Dolsan bridges.
4.3 Funding constraints also resulted in delays in land
acquisition by the project cities for the housing estate, industrial
estate, and Yeosu commercial road components. Local governments in
Korea generally funded a greater part of land development projects,
such as housing and industrial estates, through pre-sale-. During the
1970s when land prices were increasing rapidly in real terms, people
were willing to put down deposits for residential and industrial land
yet to be developed. However, the land market cooled significantly
after 1980 so that the project cities had difficulty mobilizing
funding for land acquisition through pre-sales. The issue was
resolved when the Ministry of Home Affairs, which oversees local
government financing, gave approval in April 1981 to the project
cities to borrow from commercial banks after turning down the cities'
requests for grant assistance. As a result, construction in the three
housing estates and the Gwangju industrial estate did not start in
earnest until the third quarter of 1981 alth.-;- the contracts were
awarded and construction officially started in December 1980 and
January 1981, respectively. The project cities continued to have
difficulties with counterpart funding which resulted in the Bank's
increasing the loan disbursement ratio on several components and
agreeing to direct payments to suppliers (see para. 4.5).
4.4 The Mogpo industrial estate and access road components were
re-evaluated in light of the changed economic outlook and significant
increase in development costs which doubled from 4 8.6 billion at
appraisal to W 15.8 billion after detailed engineering due to higher
land acquisition and land fill costs. A study by the Korea Research
Institute for Human Settlements in November 1981 determined that the
industrial estate was no longer feasible. The industrial estate and
access road components were therefore dropped from the project and
replaced with other high priority investments in Mogpo City (para.
4.5).
B. Revisions in the Proiect
4.5 During implementation, several revisions were made to the
design of project components, project scope and disbursement
arrangements. The major changes were as follows:
Design Changes:
(a) Dolsan Bridge: Due to the foundation conditions of the
bridge and marine traffic in the bridge area, the
consultants responsible for detailed design of the bridge
recommended a more expensive cable stay suspension bridge
instead of the steel box girder suspension bridge originally
proposed.
(b) Separate Water SuRnlv for Gwangiu Industrial Estate: Delays
in the expansion of Gwangju City's water system made it
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necessary to develop a separate source of water supply for
the industrial estate in order to market the estate upon
completion. Therefore, the industrial estate civil works
contract was extended to include some 26 km of transmission
line and treatment facilities to provide 30,000 MT/day of
water to the industrial estate at a cost of W 5.7 billion.
The Loan Agreement was amended to accommodate the above
change.
(c) Minor Modifications: Other changes to the project design
included: (i) a 20% reduction in the number of completed
housing units (the area being sold as open lots targetted to
the low-income group) in the Gwangju and Yeosu housing
estates in order to reduce the cost of housing construction
in view of the shortage of local funds; (ii) inclusion of a
small earth dam, 3.2 km of raw water transmission and a
booster station in the Narodo water supply component since
utilization of groundwater was not feasible; (iii)
modication of the Im'. shrimp storage facilities, at the
NFFC's request, to ut;.lze the existing jetty and improve
its truck access rather than constructing a new jetty with a
rail link; and (iv) addition of drainage works in the Mogpo
housing estate.
Prosect Scope:
(a) Cancellation of the MogRo Industrial Estate and Access Road:
These components were dropped due to higher costs an
projected sluggish demand for industrial land in Mogpo
(para. 4.4) and were replaced with other high priority
investments: (i) the Juksan Land Readjustment Scheme, and
extension of the Mogpo housing estate in line with the
project's overall objective to provide affordable low-income
housing; and (ii) the Mogpo drainage improvement scneme
inivolving upgrading of two major drainage channels to reduce
flood damage during heavy rainfall. The Loan Agreement was
amended in 1982 to accommodate the above changes.
(b) Apuaculture: This component was intended to expand laver
(edible seaweed) production to meet domestic demand and
increase the incomes of laver farmers, one of the poorest
groups in the rural population. However, production of
laver exceeded government projections and the resulting
oversupply dampened the farmers' enthusiasm for further
investments in facilities. The Government restricted
increases in new floating net units (which were intended to
replace the outdated and less productive bamboo slat growing
units), making loans for net units impossible. Therefore,
NFFC requested and the Bank agreed to reduce the program to
one year, eliminate the floating net units altogether, and
limit the facilities to only those for which subborrowers
had already been selected. The program as completed
consisted of three seed culture facilities, 13 processing
facilities and one net freezing facility.
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Changes in Disbursement:
(a) Disbursement Ratios. In order to reduce the financial
burden on the cities and facilitate project implementation,
the Bank increased disbursement ratios on the following
components: (a) the Gwangju industrial estate (including the
water supply component) from 44% to 55% (Bank letter of
November 30, 1982); (b) the Yeosu commercial road from 44%
to 80% (Bank letter of November 30, 1982); and (c) Mogpo
City inner drainage from 44% to 74% (Bank letter of
September 15, 1983). Even at the higher disbursement ratios,
the Bank loan still exceeded the estimated foreign exchange
requirements of the project. The disbursement ratio was also
increased for consultant's services from 60% of total
expenditures to 100% of foreign expenditures and 60% of
local expenditures (March 30. 1981) and overseas training
from 100% of foreign expenditures to 100% of total
expenditures in order to facilitate the processing of these
expenditures (February 14, 1983).
(b) Disbursement Procedures. Due to budgetary shortages, the
cities were having difficulties in mobilizing funds to make
payments to contractors prior to seeking Bank reimbursement.
In order to ease the cities' cash flow requirement and
accelerate disbursements, the Bank agreed to pay the
contractors directly (Procedure III: Application for Direct
Payment) on condition that the cities give assurances that
the local counterpart funds would be forthcoming in a timely
manner (letter of November 22, 1983).
C. Phvsical Progress
4.6 Actual implementation of the project was completed in
November 1985, about two years behind the original completion date of
December 1983. A comparison of the planned and actual implementation
schedules is given in Annex 1. The closing date of the project was
extended by one year to June 30, 1985. 4_J
4.7 The slower than expected physical progress resulted from
delays during the start-up period (paras. 4.2 and 4.3) which could not
be made up during the latter part of implementation. Construction of
the project bridges, for example, was constrained by government
budgetary problems which caused the demobilization of the contractor
for the Jindo Bridge in September 1981, well before the end of the
construction season. The Government was also initially reluctant to
field a full construction supervisory team for the Dolsan Bridge
(proposing to use part-time inputs from the Jindo supervisory team) as
4J Although the Mogpo Drainage component was not completed at the
time of loan closing, no extension of the closing date was sought
since the contract was on-going and all disbursements were expected to
be completed by December 1985, or within 6 months of the revised
closing date.
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a cost-cutting measure. This arrangement was unsatisfactory and the
matter was resolved only after the Bank had suspended disbursements on
the Dolsan Bridge in August 1982. Land acquisition problems resulted
in further delays of the Gwangju housing estate, due to the holdout of
one owner, and the Juksan land re-adjustment component due to lack of
funds.
D. Proiect Cost and Financing
4.8 Total project costs were significantly higher than estimated
at appraisal in won terms but were slightly below the estimate in
terms of US dollars. The total project cost at appraisal was V 75.1
billion (US$154.8 million equivalent) including taxes, duties n.td
contingencies. Actual costs totaled W 104.8 billion (US$141.1 million
equivalent), an increase of 40% in won terms but a decrease of 9% in
US dollar terms. A detailed comparison of actual and estimated costs
is shown in Annex 2. The higher won costs were due to a combination
of higher inflation than estimated, longer implementation periods, and
some design changes (para. 4.5). The greatest price increases were
related to the two bridges. At the time of appraisal, inflation in
Korea was projected at 10% in 1979, 9% in 1980 and 8% thereafter. In
reality, wholesale prices rose by 19% in 1979, 39% in 1980, 20% in
1981, then dropped to 5% in 1982, and remained below 1% p.a.
thereafter. The savings in US dollar terms was due to a devaluation of
the Korean won following the Government's decision to move from a
fixed exchange rate to the dollar to a floating rate system. As a
result, the won depreciated from W 484 to the dollar in 1979 to W 660
by end-1980 and eventually to W 870 by 1985, the last year of
implementation.
4.9 The cost overruns aggravated the already difficult local
funding situation, both in the central and local governments (paras.
4.2 and 4.3). Financing for the project was provided by the Bank
(37%), the Central Government (24%), local governments (22%), the
Korea Housing Bank (14%), the Korea Development Bank (2%) and the
National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives and the Shinan County
Cooperative (1%). Annex 3 provides a detailed breakdown of the
financing plan.
E. Disbursements
4.10 The loan was disbursed over six years, or one and a half
years longer than the appraisal estimate of 4 1/2 years. However,
actual performance still compares favorably with the disbursement
profile for Korea which shows disbursements averaging six years.
Disbursement of the loan did not begin until two years after loan
effectiveness. Bank guidelines at the time when this project was
prepared did not require that detailed engineering be completed prior
to Board presentation. Therefore, delays in detailed engineering
(para. 4.2) led to delays in project start-up, which was further
delayed by land acquisition problems (para. 4.3). Disbursements from
the various categories of the loan are shown in Annex 4. A comparison
of cumulative loan disbursements with the appraisal estimate is shown
in Annex 5.
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4.11 Even with the increased contract costs in won terms, the
devaluation of the won resulted in savings in the loan amount in US
dollar terms. As a result, a total of US$13.8 million (21%) of the
original loan amount was cancelled, US$12.78 million on October 9,
1984 at the request of Government and US$1.02 at the time of loan
closing on December 18, 1985. MOC fully utilized its loan allocation
due to cost overruns on the bridges. Savings under the loan occurred
in the local government components.
F. Procurement
4.12 Procurement under the project was satisfactory. The bulk of
procurement for civil works was carried out by GRCO, which had
experience with Bank procurement procedures due to its
responsibilities as the primary implementing agency for the Secondary
Cities Project (Ln. 1070-KO). The project was advertised in August
1979 in accordance with ICB procedures for prequalification. As in
many other projects in Korea, only local contractors appl!ed to be
prequalified, many of theui regional contractors. Fifty three were
prequalified for the project and six were qualified for the cable stay
bridges. Because of the complex construction techniques involved in
bridge construction and the limited experience of local contractors
with such techniques, the six contractors were asked to enter into
joint venture arrangements with foreign contractors who had experience
in construction of cable stay bridges. Project contracts are
summarized in Annex 6.
4.13 NFFC requested changes in procurement of laver processing
equipment from ICB to prudent shopping since these machines were
produced by only 11 firms in Japan and Korea. In order to expedite
implementation, the Bank agreed to internatioual prudent shopping,
allowing direct contact with all 11 manufacturers (in lieu of
advertising), a 45-day tender period and simultaneous provision of
tender documents to the suppliers and the Bank.
G. Performance of Consultants. Contractors and Suppliers
4.14 The consultants, contractors and suppliers performed
satisfactorily. However, the foreign consultant firm supervising the
cable stay bridge had some difficulty in its relationship with GRCO
due to characteristics of the business culture in Korea. For example,
the consultant and GRCO differed in their perception of safety
considerations in bridge construction. The consultant felt that the
Korean contractors were cutting corners and jeapordizing quality to
reduce costs and meet the implementation schedule, while the Koreans
considered the consultants to be excessively cautious, to the point of
being obstructive. Despite these difficulties, the consultant played
a very important role in providing quality control. Since these were
the first major cable stay bridges built in Korea, the foreign
consultants were critical in transferring cable stay bridge technology
to the MOC and the local contractors.
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H. Gmnpliance with Loan Covenants
4.15 There were no major problems with compliance with loan
covenants. Annex 7 summarizes the major covenants contained in the
loan agreement and the status of compliance.
I. Reporting and Audits
4.16 Submission of progress reports was satisfactory. Twenty
bimonthly progress reports prepaced by the local consultants
supervising all construction except for the bridges were submitted as
planned between October 1980 and ')ecember 1983. Fifteen bimonthly
progress reports prepared by the consultants supervising bridge
construction were submitted to the Bank from July 1982 to November
1984. These reports were also used by GRCO and MOC for monitoring the
progress of the prcoject. GRCO provided audited project accounts,
prepared by external private auditors, for fiscal years 1980 to 1985
in accordance with the Loan Agreement.
V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE
A. Performance of the Implementing Agency
5.1 The performance of implementing agencies was generally
satisfactory. GRCO, the main implementing agency, performed extremely
well. Despite some problems with delays in land acquisition
experienced during the start-up period, GRCO, the cities and the
provincial government have worked closely together both during project
preparation and implementation. As a result, there have been no
"turn-over" problems, such as refusal by local governments to accept
the completed project or disputes over design standards, which
typically occur when a national government agency constructs a project
on behalf of local governments and turns it over to the local
government for operation and maintenance upon completion.
5.2 Implementation of the aquaculture component was coordinated
by NFFC's International Banking Department which was not responsible
for actually carrying out the component. The component was only a
very small part of NFFC's overall operations. The status of the
aquaculture program within NFFC's regular operation:; and its
relationship with the Government's aquaculture program beirg promoted
by the Office of Fisheries were not clear. As a result, the component
never got off the ground and eventually was cut back significantly
during implementation (para. 4.5).
5.3 Ironically, the difficulty in implementing the aquaculture
program and resulting cut-back may have reduced the damage which
resulted from overinvestment by farmers in laver processing equipment.
The return from investing in laver processing equipment was initially
considered to be so lucrative that many farmers and cooperatives
purchased equipment with loans from local banks. This led to
overproduction of higher quality laver, a drop in prices and losses to
many investors. As of November 1986, all but one of the 17 sub-
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borrowers under the aquaculture program were in arrears in serviclng
their loan obligations to NFFC.
B. PerfornMce of the Bank
5.4 The Bank's partlcipation in the project allowed the
Government to complete the regional planning and development process
thiat started with the UNDP-funded reglonal development studies in the
early 1970s (para. 2.1). The Bank provided financing for a multi-year
comprehensive regional project involving both national and local
government agencies. Furthermore, the Bank's intervention assisted
the Government to rationalize the project, select the least-cost
option and drop some doubtful projects (para. 2.3). The Bank pla)ed a
role in transferring cable stay bridge technology througbh the inputs
of consultants during supervision missions.
.
5.5 Within the Bank, the project also brought out the
difficulties of dealing with projects which cut across traditional -
sectoral lines. While the acquaculture component addressed the _
economic needs of the poorer island areas of the region -- a major
priority for both the/Bank and the Government under the project, the
Bank may have acted too hastily i:t developing the component for
inclusion in the project, especially considering that laver production _
is carried out only in Korea and Japan, the Bank has no expertise in
this activity and many questions had been raised on the institutional
capacity of NFFC. On the other hand, the need to have all components
(some of which had been under preparation for some time while others
like the aquaculture component had been only identified late in the
project cycle) appraised simultaneously, forced the Bank appraisal
team to decide to include the component prematurely.
5.6 All components of the project were supervised by the Urban
and Water Supply Division of the East Asia and Pacific Projects
Department. During the implementation period, a total of 12 1
supervision missions visited Korea, with an average of about seven -
staff-weeks per year spent on supervision in the field. The Bank
supervision missions supported MOC's efforts to obtain appropriate U
budget resources, and as a result of this intervention (not only
limited to this project), the Government began adopting multi-year
rolling budgets for Bank-asslsted projects which facilitated planning I
over the life of the project. The quality of the working relationship
between the Bank and MOC, NFFC and the local governments was 0
excellent. The Bank also responded to the Government's request to
provide an outside expert on bridge construction and cortributed
significantly to technology transfer in cable stay bridge
construction.
VI. PROJECI JUSTIFICATION
A. Strengthening the Economic Base
6.1 Since the project was only completed in 1985, it is still too
early to assess its overall development impact on the Gwangju Reglon
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as a whole. However, the project can be said to have had a positive
effect in strengthening the economic base of the region through
industrial development in Gwangju and potential tourism development in
the coastal areas.
6.2 The Gwangju industrial estate is expected to have a
significant effect on promoting industrial development in the region.
At full utilization, the estate will contain a total of 110 factories,
w4th electronics and chemicals accounting for 30% and 20% of the
factories, respectively. Total employment in the estate is expected
to be between 9,000 to 10,000. As of end-1986, 51 factories were in
operation, employing a total of 4,288 persons. For comparison, the
total number of people employed in manufacturing in the Gwangju Region
in 1982 (the latest year for which data are available) was 63,349.
6.3 The majority of factories (about 75% of the total) are being
established by local firms, with 29% relocating from an existing
industrial estate. Of the factor.tes being established by non-regional
firms, 22 (20%) are from Seoul. Two major electrical companies,
Daewoo and Goldstar, together pArchased about 32% of the industrial
estate area after representatives of Gwangju City and the local
chamber of commerce actively promoted the estate in Seoul, Pusan and
other major industrial areas. At W 50,000 per py, the sales price was
competitive compared to Seoul and Pusan where industrial land prices
were over W 100,000 per py. Gwangju City also provided a pool of
cheaper labor and a market for manufactured goods.
6.4 The industrial estate is considered a success, and Gwangju
City is planning to develop an additional 340,000 py adjacent to the
estate, with assistance from the Korea Land Development Corporation.
6.5 The project also encouraged tourism in the Gwangju area.
With the rise in per capita incomes, domestic tourism is expected to
increase throughout Korea. The coastal areas of Jeonra Nam Province
retain a natural beauty which should be attractive to local tourists.
In view of the country's well developed highway system, the proximity
of Jeonra Nam Province to Pusan and other cities in the southeast
(only about several hours drive by expressway), and the increase in
privately-owned motor vehicles in Korea, an increasing number of
tourists can be expected to travel by car to the region. The Jindo
and Dolsan bridges constructed under the project should facilitate
this tourism by providing direct links between the mainland and Jindo
and Dolsan Islands. The bridges, the first cable stay bridges in
Korea, could well become tourist attractions in their own right.
B. Economic Re-evaluation
6.6 An economic re-evaluation was carried out to assess the
project's expected outcome. Given time and data constraints, it was
not possible to re-evaluate all project components; therefore,
economic rates of return (ERRs) were estimated for the project's key
components -- those for transportation, housing estates and the
industrial estate. Together, these components account for about 77%
of total project costs. The methodology used in the re-evaluation
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follows that used at the tlme of appraisal. A summary of the
calculations is shown in Annex 8.
6.7 The weighted average ERR of the key project components is
12%. This is lower than the weighted average of 23% estimated for the
entire project at appraisal, largely due to higher-than-expected costs
of the bridges and road constructed under the project and slower-than-
expected sales (and thus benefits) of thie housing developed.
Nevertheless, this rate of return is considered sufficient since the
project was in large part motivated by equity concerns and was
implemented in a relatively less developed part of the country.
6.8 TransUortation. ERRs were estimated for the Jindo bridge,
the Dolsan bridge and the Yeosu commercial road. All three components
experienced significant cost increases over appraisal estimates due to
higher land costs in the case of the Yeosu commercial road and higher
construction costs in the case of the two cable stay bridges. The
Bank was aware of the cost increases for the bridges when tenders were
received and re-estimated the respective ERRs which, though lower than
at appraisal, were considered acceptable. Savings in vehicle
operating costs and passenger time costs were taken as the project
benefits for all three components. Table 1 shows the cost increase
involved in each component and compares the re-evaluated ERRs with
those estimated at appraisal and at the time of contract award for the
bridges.
TABLE 1: Estimated and Actual Returns for the Project
Transport Components
(%)
ERR
Cost
Increase aJ Appraisal Revised b_J PCR
Jindo Bridge 93 16 14 18
Dolsan Bridge 477 29 12 12
Yeosu Commercial Rd 180 29 - 14
aJ Increase in actual cost compared to appraisal costs including
price and physical contingencies.
bJ Obtained from Memorandum to Files dated January 27, 1981.
6.9 Industrial Estate. Construction of the Gwangju industrial
estate and associated water works was completed at end-1983. Sales
performance of the industrial estate has been good, and was completed
by mid-1986. Almost half the estate (170,000 py or 47%) was sold by
end-1983 (i.e., before the estate was completed) and over 80% (305,359
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py) by end-1984. The initial sales price was U 50,000 per py which
was gradually increased to W 70,000 per py by 1986. Sales of the
standard factories began in 1983 and were completed by 1985. Factory
prices started at W 200,000 in 1983 and were increased to W 264,000 by
1986. The average sales price of the industrial land was about
W 55,800 per py compared to an average development cost of W 54,900.
As a matter of policy, the sales price of the land was set to' recover
only the development costs since the industrial estate was built to
promote manufacturing dovelopment rather than to make profits.
6.10 As at appraisal, the projected revenues from the sales of
land and factories, property taxes and water charges were used to
estimate economic benefits. Property values were assumed to increase
at 3% per annum in real terms, given the expected growth of Gwangju
City. On this basis, the ERR for the industrial estate is 9%.
6.11 Housing Estate. Housing estateri developed under the first
regional project (i.e., the Secondary Cities Regional Project) went on
sale during the late 1970s when .Korea was experiencing a rapid
increase in land prices and were sold out almost immediately. Based
on this experience, the cities included in the Second Regional Project -
anticipated a short sales period and expected to finance their share
of project costs through pre-sales. The marketing plan for the
housing estates was discussed with the Bank in January 1982.
6.12 However, actual sales of the housing estates did not proceed
as rapidly as the cities had expected, which exacerbated their already
tight budgetary situation arising from the economic recession (para.
4.3). Several factors made potential buyers wary of commiting funds
for sites yet to be developed as they had done in the past. First and
foremost, the stabilization of land prices in the early 1980s and the
general economic recession dampened demand for housing. Second, the
proposed sites were located some distance from the center of the city
and, in the case of the Gwangju and Mogpo, the sites lacked access to
public transport. Third, the Gwangju houtsing estate was expected to
accommodate workers from the Gwangju industrial estate, which was
still under constructiun when the housing estate was completed.
6.13 Actual sales took five years for the Gwangju and Mogpo
housing estates and six years for the Yeosu housing estate. The
average sales prices for the different types of lot are shown in Table
2 below.
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IOUIL 2: Average Sales Price Per Lot by Type and
Housing Estate
(W million)
Gwangju Mogpo Yeosu
27 py Corehouse 6.5 7.1 7.8
30 py Corehouse 8.3 9.0 9.4
General Lots 7.3 12.9 11.1
Commercial Lots 17.9 19.9 37.2
Source: Letter from Y. C. Koh dated June 10, 1987.
As at appraisal, the re-evaluated ERR was estimated using sales values
of the general, commercial and public lots and imputed rental values
for the 9 py and 12 py corehouses as the project benefits. Property
values were assumed to grow at 3% per annum in real terms in line with
the overall development of the cities. On this basis, the ERRs were
re-estimated as follows: Gwangju housing estate, 11%; Mogpo housing
estate, 7%; and Yeosu housing estate, 16%.
VII. LESSONS LEARNED
7.' Experience gained under the Second Gwangju Regional
Development Project provided the Bank with additional guidance in
designing future regional projects. The project was, of course, only
part of a more extensive government effort to channel resources to the
region, and its impact on the region should be considered in that
context. Since data on the regional distribution of government
budgets is not readily available in Korea, total public investment in
the region has been roughly estimated by using the total value of
civil engineering work contracted in Jeonra Nam Province as a proxy
for overall public investment. Considering only civil engineering
contracts for forestry conservation, flood control, dams, irrigation,
water supply and sewerage, roads and bridges, and land development --
all typical government activities -- but excluding construction of
housing and factories, between 1980 and 1985, civil engineering
contracts in Jeonra Nam Province totaled W 1,232.7 billion. With
total civil works carried out under the project (excluding
aquaculture) costing W 84.7 billion, the project represented only
about 7% of all civil engineering contracts in Jeonra Nam Province
during the project period. The project's impact was therefore
somewhat circumscribed relative to the total regional development
effort. In order to promote development in a specific region, the
Government needs to consider the total amount of central government
funds being invested in that region. In view of this need, future
regional development projects should probably encourage the Government
to prepare a regional breakdown of the development budgets, which
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would highlight the total amount of central government resources being
provided to different parts of the country and allow for better
coordination among the various ministries and agencies.
7.2 However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no role
for separate regio.nal development projects. Regional disparitie: are
primarily political and social problems. Less developed regions are
generally at a comparative disadvantage from an economic point of
view. Jeonra Nam Province was not able to diversify out of agriculture
into manufacturing because it was located farthest away from Seoul and
Busan, the country's two main economic centers. Regional development
projects are useful in that, by being a separate activity solely for
that region, they can be easily identified as an effort to do
something "special" to help a certain area of the country.
7.3 While the project may not have been large relative to the
overall investment in the region, it did have a significant impact on
the investment programs of the project cities. The project provided
the cities with an additional source of funds to tap for their
development projects. Table 3 compares project costs with estimated
capital formation (for both General and Special Accounts) in the three
project cities for 1980 to 1985. The overall finances of the project
cities are summarized in Annex 9. The project is estimated to have
accounted for between 23% of city investments in Gwangju to 41% of
investments in Yeosu between 1980 and 1985. It can also be observed
that the project's share is greater in the smaller cities with
relatively smaller overall investment levels.
TABLE 3: Comparison of Project Investment Costs to
Estimated Capital Formation for 1980 to 1985
(in W billion)
Gwangju Nogpo Yeosu
Project Investments (A) 30.0 22.3 11.4
Capital Formation (B) 131.9 56.4 27.4
Share of A to B 23% 39% 41%
Source: Annex 9.
7.4 Finally, the project indicated some of the drawbacks of
taking a top down, "convoy" approach where all project components are
expected to be prepared, appraised and implemented simultaneously.
Some components became higher priority, were prepared earlier than the
rest and required separate sources of funding, e.g., the water source
development, transmission and treatment facilities which were financed
with savings from the first regional project (para. 2.2). Other
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priority components, such as the acquaculture component, were
ldentified when preparation of the other components was well advanced
and were included without sufficient preparation. In the future,
multl-component regional projects should be designed to allow maximum
flexibility to react to changing local priorities.
7.5 In sum, future regional development projects should place
more emphasis on developing an institutlonal framework for identifying
and implementing development projects in the region. In addition to
central government investments which will contlnue to be an important
part of the project, the project might also aim at developing
mechanisms to:
(a) regionalize central government resource allocations by
preparing regional breakdowns of annual budgets (para. 7.1);
and
(b) implement local government (provincial, city, county)
projects. This might necessitate development of a financing
scheme, e.g., a Regional Development Fund, to provide the
local governments with the capability to implement their own
projects. If the technical capability of the local
government is weak, the project may require a central
government agency, such as the Ministry of Construction, to
carry out the work on behalf of the local government or may
even require the establishment of a separate agency, e.g., a
Regional Development Corporation.
It is therefore suggested that regional development projects take a
program approach and aim at establishing the rules for project funding
rather than the "convoy" approach of preparing, evaluating and
implementing all the components imultaneously.
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KORER
SECOND WNWH6JU RE6ICOHL PROJECt (LOAN 1758-00)
PROJECt CIPLETION REPORT
Cmvarison f Rppraisal nd Rctual Project Costs
_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. .. _. _ _.................................. ......  _._
Rppraisal Estimate Rctual
I foreign I Foreign
Conponents Local foreign Total Exchange Local forcign total Exchange
Housing Estate, 6umgJu 1,091 2,616 6,707 39S 6,100 3,613 10,021 36.1Z
Housing Estate, ngpo ?,392 2,169 5,561 391 7,410 4,321 11,761 36.7%
Pousing Estate Yeosu 2,351 1,140 3,791 38Z 5,633 2,350 7.983 29.41
Juksan Residenfial - - - 1,605 828 2,633 31.52
Industrial Estate, hwangju 0,521 5,111 13,638 391 13,243 6,783 20,026 33.92
Industrial Estate, Nl*ow 3,869 2,579 6,418 I0L 0 0 0 -
Access Road 1,088 1,541 3,425 452 2,955 1,993 4,940 10.3
Rogpo Uater Supply 2,060 1,979 1,039 '19 3,391 2,802 6,193 45.2?
Yeosu Uater Distribution 467 1' 082 i7n 282 282 564 50.0?
Ibrodo Oeuelopuent 205 149 351 12? 217 143 360 39,8?
RHgpo Drainage - - - 1,078 588 1,666 35.3?
Veosu Coerwcial Road 1,000 301 1,309 23? 2,343 460 2,811 16.6?
Dolsan Bridge 1,060 1,464 2,524 58? 7,703 10,199 17,902 57.0?
Jindo Bridge 1,312 1,887 3,199 59? 4,769 6,041 11,610 58.9?
Parodo Terninal (rerry) - - - - 212 169 381 tl .Z
Shritp Storage (Itija Island) 451 288 739 39? 163 241 404 59.7Y
uiPuculture 1,221 701 2,002 39S 169 670 0t7 00.0?
Technical Rssistance 873 1,310 2,183 60? 1,881 2,825 4,709 60.0?
Base Cost 32,768 24,033 56,601 12?
Phsical Contingencies l,012 2,788 6,800 41S
Price Contingencies 6,784 4,714 11,198 41l
Total Contingencies 10,796 7,502 18,298 41?
TOTAL PROJECT COST 43,564 31,535 75,099 42? 59,695 K,124 104,819 13.0?
U*Xr CCU== =:*=U UU U=X
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KOREA
SECOND GUANSJU REGIONAL PROJECT (LOAN 1758-KO)
PROJECT OHPLETION REPORT
Financing Plan
(w sillion)
IBRD "DC City KGB KHB Others Total
Guangju Housing Estate 3,800 - 451 - 5,770 - 10,021
Nagpo Housing Estate 4,359 - 2,288 - 5,114 - 11,161
Yeosu Housing Estate 2,460 - 1,300 - 4,223 - 7,983
Juksan Land Re-adjusteent 608 - 1,825 - - - 2,633
G6angju Industrial Estate 7,797 - 12,239 - - - 20,026
Access Road 1,926 3,022 - - - - 4,948
Nagpo Vater Supply 2,126 - 2,007 2,060 - - 6,193
Yeosu Mater Supply 237 - 181 146 - - 564
Narado Water Supply 119 - - 241 - - 360
Nogpo Drainage 941 - 725 - - - 1,666
Yeosu Commercial Rd. 599 - 2,212 - - - 2,911
Jindo Bridge 4,115 7,495 - - - - 11,610
Dolsan Bridge 5,339 12,563 - - - - 17,902
Narado Terminal i17 224 - - - - 381
Aquaculture 730 - - - - 117 847
Shriep Storage 169 186 - - - 50 404
T/A 3,255 1,454 - - - - 4,709
38,926 24,944 23,228 2,447 15,107 167 104,819
Others = NfC and Co-operatives
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KOREA
SECOND 6WANBJU REGIONAL PROJECT !LOAN 1758-KO)
PROJECT OMPLETION REPORT
Disbursement of Loan by Category
(USM Equivalent)
Category Aoount allocated Aount disbursed
in Loan Agreement % as of 12/31/85 X
Civil Works 40,000,000 61.5% 46,01B,287.88 9.9%
Equipment 2,030,000 3.1% 921,564.07 1.8%
Aquaculture Credit 450,000 0.72 0.00 0.0%
Consultaot's 5,800,000 8.91 4,174,137.35 8.2Z
Services & Studies
Overseas Training 200,000 0.3% 85,671.99 0.21
Unallocated 16,520,000 25.4Z
TOTAL 65,000,000 100.0I 51,199,661.29 100.0I
Cancellation 13,800,338.71 al
a/ US$ 12.78 million was cancelled on October 9,1984 and US$1.02 was
cancelled on December 18, 1985.
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KOREA
SECOND 6NANJJU REGIONAL PROJECT (LOAN 1758-KU)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Estimated and Actual Accueulated Disburseemnts
(USS million)
Semester Ending Appraisal Actual Z
Estimate Disbursed
December 31 1979 0.30 0.00 al 0.02
June 30, 1940 1.50 0.00 0.0%
December 31 1980 6.90 1.41 2.21
June 30, 1941 16.50 4.06 6.2%
December 31 1981 28.10 7.96 12.22
June 30, 1942 41.30 11.81 18.21
December 31 1982 52.40 18.20 28.0Z
June 30, 1943 63.20 24.69 38.0Z
December 31 1983 65.00 41.32 63.6Z
June 30, i144 46.85 72.11
December 31 1984 50.27 77.3Z
June 30, 1945 50.77 b/ 78.1I
December 31, 1985 51.20 c/ 78.8%
a/ Lcan became ffective F bruary 15, 1980.
bl Loan closing date. Disbursements were orocessed upto
December 1995 uhen the loan was officially c osed
cl Out of a loan of US$65.00 sillion, US$12.78 aillion and
US$1.02 million *ere cancelled on9/28/84 and 12/18/85,
respectively.
KRE
SECONID 6UNiJU O RESINAL PROJECT LOAN 1758-MOAB
PROJECT COhPLETION REPORT
Sumary of Contracts
(Man Nillions)
Original Final
Bid Biddinq Signing Start End Contract Contract
Subject Firm Announcement Date Date Date Date Amount -mount
6Sangju Housina Estate Kuk Dong Construc.Co 10/06/80 Il/20/80 01/1501M 011201BI 10/03194 9,130 8,943
Hogpo Housing Estate Hiryung Construction 10/06/80 11/20/90 12/20/80 12/26/90 09/21/83 6,575 10,337
Yeosu Housing Estate Kumuang Company 10/06/80 11/20/80 12/201/0 12/26/B0 04/27/03 4,976 5,760
Gmangia Industrial Estate hanila Construction Ltd 10/06/00 11/20/80 01115181 01120/91 12120163 7,723 15.702
Yeos. Commercial Road Hanlla Construction Ltd 031121/2 04112182 05/03/82 05106/92 02125/B3 871 *936
Yeosu Mater Supply Kyong Hyan? Construction 07/29/90 09/13/90 10/06/80 10/18180 12128/81 781 564
Narodo Mater Supply Naudo Cons ruction Ltd. 10/06/90 11/20/00 12/20/90 12/26/80 12/25/81 334 318
Narodo Terminal Naado Construction Ltd. 07/16/80 09/13/90 10/06/10 10/06180 10/31/81 343 376
loqpo Water Supply Sam Bo Construction 10/29/79 12101/79 12/29179 12129/79 12128181 4,239 5094O
Imia Shrimp Storage Dong 6wang Construction 11/10/80 12/10/90 12/20/80 12/26/80 09/07/82 477 402
8uangju Access Road Han Kook Kun Up Const. 10/29/79 12/01/79 12/28/79 12120/79 12/20/83 3,245 4,614
Jindo Bridge Hyundai Construction Co. 09/10/80 11/17/80 12/20/80 12/26/80 12/30/84 9,866 11,401
Dolsan Bridge Daelim Industrial Co. 09/10/90 11/17/80 12120/90 12/26/80 12125/94 9,747 16,99B
Nogpo Drainage Kyong Nam Enterprise 09/01/83 09/16/83 10104/93 10/10/93 07/05/84 1,229 1,306
Juksan Land Readjustment Hankuk Pavement Cunstr. 11122/93 12/10/83 12/24/03 12/26/B3 11/30/05 2,010 1,992
Detailed Design for Ph 11 T.A.E. 12/30/78 12/30/78 04/05/80 269 269
Construction SPf - Ph ll KECC 12117/80 12123f80 12131I93 338 287
Construction SPN Bridges R.P.T. 05/29/81 06/01/81 04/15/85 1,429 2,255Cheonjh - Feasibility KECC/SI6NA 05/18/11 05/1/81 05/13/82 768 759
Cheonja Design KiCC 12/22/82 12/29/82 12/26/83 919 849
Island Development Study Doawa Technical 07/04/83 07/04/83 04/21/84 99 94
Evaluation Chonnam University 05/09/84 05/10/84 03/28/85 89 86
_ _ _ _--------- - -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------
'a'
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KOREA
SECOND GSANGJU REGIOMNL PROJECT ILOAN 1758-KO)
PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT
Covenants in Loan Agrment
Section Activity Remarks
4.05(b) IIC6 shall gradually raise average rate of taiffs Mater ates wre raised in 1979 and in 1981.
for water supplied to camunities outside logpo
City so that by fiscal year 1995, the rate shall be
adequate o generate revenue sufficient to covw
the full cost of production, treatment and trans-
sission of water supplied to the comunities.
4.05(c) 6CS shall raise the average rate of tariff for NIter rates ere raised in 1979 and in 191.
water supplied at Narodo Islands by at least 5Z
annually in real terms until rate is adequate o
recover capital expenditures and operating and
maintenance cost.
4.06(a)(SCS, YC, 66C, and NFFC shall operate and uintain Complied mith.
facilities transferred to thes.
4.Oa)(6CB shall make available staff, equipment and other Complied with.
reswrces for proper operation and saintenance of
transferred facilities.
4.07 The borrower shall (a) cause the Daedong du to be Draft maintenance plan was submitted in Sep. 1961.
periodically inspected; and Ib) cause Jefnora lNa
Provincial Government a d ICS to prepare I furnish
to the Bank a report an such arrangements by
Decesber 31, 1980.
5.01 Subsidiary Loan Agreement shall be executed on Subsidiary Loan Agreemnt was executed in Nov. 79,
behalf of Borroer and 6C6, NC6, YC6, BBC and NFFC
as an additional condition of effectiveness.
5.02 Subsidiary Loan Agreement shall be authorized or lepl onon lawd Decur 1979 and 1t low
ratified by the Borrower and 6C6, IC6, YC6, 66C and ben etfectlw on r*vy IS. 198
NFFC and shall be legally binding.
nal- fl…fl______ ef l - _ _
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KOREA
SECOND GWAN6JU REGIONAL PROJECT ILOAN 1756-KO)
PROJECT ONPLETION REPORT
Covenants in Loan Agreesent
Section Activity Remarks
4.03(c) 6C6 shall allocate atleast one third of the net Not applicable. No new residential areas were
residential area of any future housing development, developed bythe city during project period.
in the vicinity ofnew access road, to low-incose
housing to be sold to families with incomes inthe
lower half of 6xangju City Household income
distribution at the time of sales.
4.041a) The Borrower shall take all measures toensure the Complied with. Due to the delay in completion of
availability of adequate and timely water supply to Dong Buk Dae, a smaller water supply project was
housing and industrial estates tobe constructed in added to the industrial estate.
Cwangju City.
4.04(b) The Borrower shall take all measures toensure the Haenan-bwangju and Swangiu-Nogpo sections were
completion of paving of highways which connect paved. Work began in 1962 on Jindo-Haenas I due to
Jindo with Hamnam, 6vangju and Hogpo by the time budget constraints, heroad Nas not going to be
the bridge construction hasbeen completed. ready, but then Govt. made resources availabe in
1984 Supp. and 1985 budtet to get the roads ready.
4d05(a) Beginning with fiscal year lYE?- NCB and YCG shall Water ates were raised in 1979 and in 1981.
raise the average rates of tariff by at least 5%
annually inreal terms until the operations become
financially viable (sue of gross revenues from all
sources, consumer contributions in aid of construc-
tion and net operating income shall equal or exceed
the sum of all expenditures attributable to
operation, maintenance andadministration (but
excluding depreciation andother non-cash operating
charges), working capital requirements, payments of
interest and debt charges, taxes, cash dividends
and other cash distribution of surplus, any other
capital expenditures forwhich no financing has
been secured and any cash defecits incurred inany
previous fiscal year).
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KOREA
SECOND 6#AN6JU RE61ONAL PROJECT (LOAN 1758-KO)
PROJECT CONPLETION REPORT
Covenants in Loan Agreement
Section Activity Reearks
3.09(a) The Borrower shall by December 31, 1950 cause 6C6, Complied Nith. Due to the delay in construction,
NC6 and YCS to prepare and furnish tothe Bank: (a) the draft earketing plan was submitted in Sep. 91.
a marketing plan for allocation andsale of residen- Revised plan incorporating the Bank's coments were
tial plots and core houses and for utilization of discussed with the mission during Jan. 82. Due to
profits generated by the sale; and (bl a sanagement the adverse conomic situation, sales mere sltm, so
plan. eligibility criteria were revised topromote sales.
3.09(b) The Borrower shall by December 31, 1990 cause 6CG Same remarks a 3.09(a) above.
and MC6 to prepare and furnish tothe Bank: (a) a
marketing plan for the allocation andsale of
industrial plots and factory buildings andfor
utilization of profits generated by the sale; and
(b) amanagement plan.
4.021a) 6C6, NCG, YC6, 66C, NFFC and IRCO shall maintain Complied with.
separate reports and accounts reflecting all
expenditures.
4.02(c) Reports and Accounts to be audited for each fiscal Cooplied with.
year and to be furnished to the Bank not later
than six months after the end of each fiscal year.
4.03(a) YC6 shall, (a) furnish tothe Bank adraft urban (a) ANaster Plan for Dolsan New Town was prepared
development plan for Dolsan Island by Dec. 31. 7'° in October 1990.
and (b} take appropriate measures for payment of lb) Yeosu city reaffirmed that priority in plot
adequate compensation and secure alternative acco- allocation will be given to those displaced
modation and sites for families/enterprises businesses at the fishery harbor industrial site
dispalced by construction of Yeosu Comeercial Road. and new housing estate.
4.C3(bi MCS shall allocate at least half of the net The North Port area was developed as part of this
res:dential area of any future housing development project. Mogpo City utilized savings inthe loan
in the North Port area for construction of lower due to cancellation of the Nogpo Industrial Estate
incoee housing tobe sold to fanilies with incomes to carry out land readjustsent cheme in the area.
in the lower half of fogpo City Household income
distribution at the time of sales.
_ 
-. - - -_ - - - -- _ - - -____ 
__---- 
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KOREA
SECOND 6WANBJU RE610NL PROJECT ILOAN 1758-KI)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Covenants in Loan Agreement
Section Activity Remarks
3.02 The Borrower shall enter into subsidiary Loan Coaplied with. Subsidiary loan agreements were
Agreement vi h 6C6, hC6, YCB and NFFC under terms entersj into during November 1979 and the project
and conditions atisfactory to the Bank, including became effective on February 15, 1950.
these in Schedule 5, and providing for repayment
to the Borrower by the above of all accounts
equivalent to the proceeds of the Loan withdrawn.
3.03 The Borrower shall cause to be transferred, under Complied with. All facilities were handed over to
agreements satisfactory  the Bank, all facilities respectable ocal governments & operating agencies.
promptly upon completion of construction, to the
various agencies and city governnents.
3.04 The Borrower shall provide and cause its relevant Complied with although due to the economic
departments, KDB t KHB to provide sufficient funds recession, theproject suffered from the overall
to ensure timely and efficient carrying out of the tight budgets during 1980/81.
project.
3.05 The Borrover shall employ consultants sati factory Detail design was completed byTAE/KECC. ontract
to the Borrower and the Bank to assist in prepara- supervision was carried out by KECC for all civil
tion of plans, pecs and bidding documents andfor vorks except Jindo and Dolsan bridges which were
supervision of construction. carried out by RPT.
3.07 The Borroxer shall promptly furnish tothe Bank Complied with.
plans, pecs., reports, training programs, contract
documents, and work and procurement schedules and
any modifications or additions to in such detail as
the Bank may request.
3.99 The Borrower shall acquire all land and rights Complied with.
required for carrying out the proiect and furnish
the evidence to the Bank.
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KORER
SECONOD 119YMJU RE6IONRL PROJECT
PROJECT CIIlETIOH REPORT
ECONiI1 RE-EURLURTION
Jindo Bridge CSnponent
(in umn nillions, constant 1980 prices)
Costs Benefits
Develop Ibinte- UOS line Net
Year nent nance Total Savings Savings Benefits
1980 115.0 115.0 (115.0)
1981 921.5 929.5 (924.5)
1982 1,730.1 1,730.1 (1,730.1)
1983 3,617.0 3,617.0 (3,617.0)
19i8 2,930.9 2,930.9 (2,930.9)
1985 15.9 3.8 19.7 1.6 590.5 580.4
1986 3.8 3.8 4.9 686.7 687.8
1987 3.8 3.8 9.3 794.2 799.9
1988 3.8 3.6 15.7 923.2 935.1
1989 3.8 3.8 24.1 1,081.1 1,101.7
1998 3.8 3.8 36.2 1 ,Z81.4 1,316.9
1991 3.8 3.0 52.0 1,519.? 1,567.8
1992 3.8 3.8 72.7 1,806.2 1,875.2
1993 3.8 3.8 100.5 2,162.6 2,259.3
1994 15.5 15.5 136.9 2,603.4 2,7Z4.8
1995 3.8 3.8 187.1 3,190.0 3,373.3
1996 3.8 3.8 251.4 3,890.7 4,138.4
1997 3.8 3.8 335.4 4,769.1 5,100.8
1998 3.8 3.8 4t5.6 5,882.3 6,324.1
1999 3.8 3.8 589.1 5,787.0 6,372.4
2000 3.9 3.9 785.5 7,707.1 8,488.9
2001 3.8 3.8 1,034.0 11,104.1 12,514.3
2002 3.8 3.8 1,516.9 15,75.7 17,228.8
2083 3.8 3.8 1,700.3 18,217.7 19,991.2
2004 15.5 15.5 2,089.0 21,126.4 23,199.8
Economic Rate of Return 18.32
Hote: 1. Deolment costs include land, construction a d esign and
supervIsion, butexclude taxes (estinated to be 5? of construction
costs).
2. Iaintenance costs and benefits obtained fri Ciwonau Ibtional
University 0evelopment Inpact Nalysls of lKangju Regional Projects'
lMrch 1985.
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KOREK
SECUO OUAI(&U RE6IONRL PROJECT
PROJECT CIIPLETION REPORT
ECONIIOC RE-EURLURTION
Dolman Bridge Conponent
(in man illions, constant 1980 prices)
Costs Benefits
Oeuelop- 7uinte- WOC Tine Net
Year tient nance Total Sauings Savings Benefits
1980 0.0 0.0 0.0
1981 1,055.7 1,095.7 (1,055.?)
198I 1,635.0 1,635.0 (1,635.0)
1993 3,699.6 3,699.6 (3,699.6)
1981 7.159.4 7,159.I (7,159.4)
1985 51.3 3.8 58.0 503.9 217.6 663.5
1986 3.8 3.8 SS9.5 241.5 797.2
1907 3.8 3.8 615.1 265.5 076.9
1988 3.8 3.8 6?0.9 289.5 556.6
1989 3.8 3.0 725.8 313.3 1,035.3
1990 3.0 3.0 811.1 337.3 1,141.9
1991 3.8 3.8 845.9 365.1 1,207.2
1952 3.8 3.8 955.0 486.1 1,437.3
1993 3.8 3.8 1,406.2 607.1 2,009.6
1955 15.5 15.5 1,607.3 728.5 2,100.2
1995 3.8 3.8 1,968.1 849.0 2,811.5
19% 3.0 3.0 2,250.5 971.5 3,218.2
1997 3.0 3.0 2,540.1 1,096.8 3,633.4
15e8 3.8 3.8 2,832.0 1,222.7 1,050.9
1999 3.8 3.8 3,121.5 1,318.9 1,169.7
20W 3.8 3.0 3,418.9 1,176.1 1,891.2
2001 3.8 3.8 3,714.9 1,603.9 5,315.1
2002 3.8 3.8 4,012.1 1,732-Z b,71O.5
203 3.8 3.8 1,312.1 1,861.9 6,170.6
2001 15.5 15.5 1,634.9 2,011.7 6,634.0
Econonic Rate of Return * 11.5X
Note: 1. Deuelopent costs include land, construction and esign and
superuision, but exclude taxes (estinated to be SX of construction
costs).
2. lanteance costs and benefits obtained fron Chomm National
Uhversity *euedopent I pact RnOlysis of Kamgju Regional Projects'
narch 1985
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SECOND ISifH6JU RESIONIL PROECT
PROJECT C0PLETION REPORT
ECOHNOC RE-£URlURTION
Yeosu C.mercial Component
(in von nillions, constant 1980 prices)
Costs 8enefits
Oevelop- Ibinte- UOC line Net
Year Mnt nance Total Swings Savings 8enefits
1980
1981
1982 1,753.7 1,753.7 (1,753.7)
1983 198.1 4908. (498.1)
1989 t.9 1.9 36.1 20.5 51.7
1985 1.9 1.9 45.8 26.3 70.2
1986 2.0 2.0 57.6 33.3 88.9
1987 2.0 2.0 70.1 t0.8 109.3
1988 2.0 2.0 05.3 19.7 133.1
1909 2.0 2.0 102.9 60.0 160.9
1990 2.0 2.0 156.9 10t.2 259.1
1991 2.0 2.0 221.0 157.2 377.0
1992 2.1 2.1 230.5 219.8 "8.2
1993 2.1 2.1 389.3 299.2 681.4
199t 2.2 2.2 t99.t 384.0 081.3
1995 2.3 2.3 519.0 128.2 975.0
1996 2.3 2.3 607.5 478.8 1,081.0
1997 2.3 2.3 6U2.9 512.7 1,153.3
199 2.1 2.1 681.0 St9.2 1,227.9
1999 2.5 2.5 6W7.5 589.2 1,231.2
2000 2.5 2.5 636.8 632.8 1,267.2
2001 2.6 2.6 559.2 680.6 1,237.2
2002 2.6 2.6 S26.1 732.9 1,256.4
2003 2.7 2.7 199.8 790.1 1,287.2
Economic Rate of Return 11.01
Note: 1. Deuelopent costs include land, construction and esign a d
supervision, but exclude taxes (estirated tobe 51 of construction
costs).
2. Ibintenance costs and benefits obtained from Chonnm National
University *Deuelomet Inpact Rnalysis of Kaangju Regional Projects'
March 1985.
-34 - ANNEX 8
Page 4 of 7
SECOiD 61R16U RE610RIM PMIECT
PROJECT CLEtIOH ROT
ECUONUC RE-EJRU3TINO
6agu Industriad Estae Cwponent
(in von illions, constant 190 prices)
Costs eneWfits
eweop tbinte- Land ractory Uater Loal Tax met
Year rent nae Total Sales Sales Reenues Revenues Benefits
1990
1981 3,869.5 3,869.5
1982 4,846.3 1,846.3 166.5 (4,679.7)
1983 6,110.3 6,110.3 7,153.0 182.0 891.7
1981 821.7 821.7 6,902.? 39S.4 6,473.5
1985 70.7 70.7 547.0 286.5 762.8
1986 70.7 70.7 798.5 169.7 897.5
1987 70.7 70.7 169.7 1.2 100.2
i9m8 70.7 70.7 169.7 $5.2 151.2
1989 70.7 70.7 169.7 111.3 210.3
i990 70.7 70.7 169.7 117.9 216.9
1991 78.7 70.7 169.7 121.5 223.5
1992 70.7 78.7 169.7 124.5 ZZ3.5
1993 70.7 70.7 169.7 124.5 223.5
1991 70.7 70.7 169.7 124.5 223.5
1995 70.7 70.7 169.7 121.5 223.5
1996 70.7 70.7 169.7 12.5 223.5
1997 70.7 70.7 169.7 121.5 223.5
1998 70.7 70.7 169.7 12.; 223.5
199 70.7 70.7 169.7 121.5 223.5
2000 70.7 70.7 169.7 121.5 223.5
2001 70.7 70.7 169.? 124.5 223.5
2002 70.7 70.7 169.7 124.5 223.5
2003 70.? 70.7 169.7 121.5 223.5
2001 70.7 70.7 169.7 124.5 223.5
Ecomic Rte of Return D0.55
Not-,. i 0hopfflt costs include land, construction and design and suWrvision, but exclude taxes
(estieated to be St of construction costs).
2. ainmtetnec costs (including estinate of water supply operations) and vater reuenues
baed an discussions with 6ngju City officials.
3. Sales of land and factories and unit prices we Y.C. Kob's malysis (letter of June 10, 1987
1. Industrialist are exupted frm paying local taxes (Property and City Planning Planing Tax
at 0.61 and 0.21 repectivly) for 5 years.
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SECOND URR61U REGIOAl1 PROJECI
PROWECT COIIPETION REPORT
ECONIIiC RE-EURLUTION
hangju Hwsing Estate Cwonent
(in on nillions, cotant 1980 price)
Costs Buefits
Qevelop- Hadnte- Carcia Lvpued Net
Year nent mnce Total Sales Rents Benefits
1990
1981 577.1 577.1 (577.1)
1992 94.4 9".4 (944.)
1983 5,830.7 5,630.7 555.5 90.6 (5,161.7)
1984 453.8 153.8 1,167.2 S59.5 1,307.9
1985 129. 12. 51A.0 591.5 1,012.1
1986 129.4 129.4 328.1 612.3 811.1
i187 129.1 129.4 1,196.0 6307 1,697.3
1988 129.4 129.1 649.6 520.2
1989 129.4 129.4 669.1 539.7
1990 129.4 129.1 689.2 559.8
1991 129.4 129.4 709.9 560.1
1992 129.1 129.1 731.2 601.7
1993 129.4 129.1 753.1 623.7
199 129.4 129.4 775.7 616.3
1995 129.1 129.1 799.0 669.5
1996 129.1 129.1 822.9 693.5
1997 129.4 129.4 847.6 718.2
1998 129.1 129.4 873.0 73.6
1999 129.1 129. 899.2 769.8
2000 129.4 129.1 926.2 796.0
2001 129.4 129.1 954.0 824.6
2002 129.4 129.4 982.6 9S3.2
2003 129.1 129.4 1,01Z.1 882.7
2004 129.4 129.4 1,042.5 913.0
Econmic Rbte of Retun 10.92
Note: 1. bouelopnnt co s ilude land, construction a d desip and supesi
but excluded taxes (estlated to be S of cotruction costs).
2. Sales Mta taken frm Y.C. [oh's analysis (letter of June 10, 1987).
Land ualues are assuned to Increae at 32 p.a. in real term..
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S£CO aimsU R8E6Im PROJEC1
PM01ECC CiFlETION KMTOR
ECOIIC RE-EU8L.URTION U
Iogpo Housing Estate Coont
(In man aillins, constant 1980 prices)
Custs Bnerfits
O ldor ruinte- Cewcial lpted Net
Year nrt nsn Total Sales Rents Benefits
1910 .0
1901 2,367.1 2,367.1 0.0 (2,367.1)
9112 2,9N.7 2,974.7 30.1 0.0 (2,944.7)
1913 2,83.4 2,483.4 46.4 78.3 (2,358.?)
1981 120.0 120.0 896.0 594.5 1,371.-
1915 120.0 120.0 203.3 594.5 677.,
1916 120.0 120.0 428.6 612.3 920.9
1917 120.0 120.0 630.7 SI.7
19*1 120.0 120.0 649.6 529.6
1989 120.0 120.0 669.1 549.1
1990 120.0 120.0 689.2 569.2
1991 120.0 120.0 709.9 589.9
1992 120.0 120.0 731.2 611.2
1993 120.0 120.0 753.1 633.1
1994 120.0 120.0 775.7 655.7
1995 120.0 120.0 799.0 679.0
1996 120.0 120.0 822.9 702.9
1"? 120.0 120.0 847.6 77.6
1998 120.0 120.0 873.0 753.1
199 120.0 120.0 8"9.2 m.2
20C0 120.0 120.0 926.2 806.2
2001 1Z2.0 120.0 954.0 834.0
2002 120.0 120.0 982.6 862.6
203 120.0 120.0 1,012.1 892.1
2Q01 120.0 120.0 1,042.S 922.5
Econmic Rate of Return 6.7Z
Note: 1. HaveI t costs include land, construction and esign and smruisi
but aeluded taes (estilated tobe S of construction c sts).
2. Ilme rte of the estlmted cost of additional Juksmn Drairage Uorks
(est cat v. 2,727 aillion) exclude from sts since benefits
Mil acrw te wen as a Whole.
3. Sle dat to frm Y.C. KIob's alsis (letter of June 10, 1987).
Id lues me are d to increase at 31 p.a. in real temns.
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KOME
SECORD 9161U RESIONIL 111ECI
PRIECT M1ETIOP RE ORT
ECOliRIC E-E&URTION
Yeosu Housing Estate Cmponment
(in uon illions, constant 1980 prices)
Costs Benefits
Oeuelop- lainte- Comercial Inputed Net
nent awce Total Sales Rents 8enefits
0.0
2,514.2 2,544.2 0.0 (2,54.2)
3,247.4 3,247.4 462.2 0.0 (2,795.2)
735.0 735.0 1,133.0 338.4 736.4
83.4 83.4 1,309.3 5m4.5 1,90.5
83.4 93.4 558.6 594.5 1,069.8
83.4 83.4 652.1 612.3 1,191.0
93.4 83.4 398.7 630.7 546.0
83.4 83.4 649.6 566.3
83.4 83.4 669.1 585.8
83.4 83.4 09.2 605.8
83.4 03.4 709.9 626.5
93.4 93.4 731.2 647.9
93.4 93.4 753.1 669.7
93.4 83.4 775.7 692.3
93.4 93.A 799.0 715.6
83.4 83.4 822.9 739.6
83.4 83.4 847.6 764.3
83.4 83.4 873.0 789.7
83.4 83.4 999.2 815.9
83.4 83.4 926.2 842.9
83.4 83.4 954.0 970.6
83.4 83.4 982.6 899.3
83.4 83.4 1,012.1 928.7
93.4 83.4 1,042.5 959.1
Economic Rate of Return 15.81
1. 8huelojnent costs include land, construction and esign and supervisi
but excluded taxes (estimated o be 5t of construction c sts).
2. Sales data taken frot Y.C. Koh's analysis (letter of June 10, 1987).
Land ualues are assuned to increse at 31 p.a. in real terns.
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KOMC
KM wwu Ma FoWEoC
PROJWECT CNUtlEIN tWLt
liuju City riiances
(in m million)
1900 19S1 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total
GEEBRL ACCUNT 
Rees 25,811 33,591 33,420 37,075 40,575 54,58 225,330 ;
Expenditures 24,098 32,177 31,362 34,147 36,614 49,39D 207,811
Capital I ornaimn 10,475 13,636 8,8t4 9,831 11,134 15,00? 68,927
01ficitlSnrol 1,721 1,414 2,058 2,926 3,931 5,46 17,519
........................................................................................................
SPECaL AUT
Revenues 13,683 23,321 32,980 t9,151 51,382 51,869 225,397
Ewnditures 10,769 18,234 23,425 41,843 47,306 48,149 189,726
Deficit/Sfuplus 2,914 5,097 9,555 7,l8 7,077 3,720 35,661
....................................................... I.................................................
ReveUes 39,493 56,912 66,100 86,226 94,957 106,728 450,717
Expenditures 34,850 50,412 54,787 75,99D 83,949 97,540 397,537
Capital rsrmti.n 15,158 21,363 15,450 21,870 25,507 29,637 131,855
OeficitSurplus t,635 6,501 11,613 10,236 11,00? 9,189 53,190
Siare of Capital
rmantion 43.51 42.12 28.2 28.01 30.42 30.41 33.22
Sorce: MONR Local 6out. Finace Y.8. (1981-85) ad lluncipal Y.8, (1906) 14Jun-80
eo: a. 1985 6araBl ccount Cpitl fomtion estimated using 1984 aveaes.
h Cbined capital fornatin esinated using en Accwunt a ges for the Special Rccunt.
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KORM
SECOND 6URNJU RE6IOlAL PRiJECl
PROJECT CillPLETION REPORT
nOW City finances
(in u "llion)
1980 '981 1982 1983 1981 1985 Total
-E;N RCMfl
Revenes 7,841 12,153 12,701 16,352 14,573 15,525 79,146
Epitures 7,086 11,711 12,260 15,001 14,060 14,778 74,903
Capital rormtion 2,974 S,810 9,322 6,814 5,133 5,710 31,001
Deficit/Surplus 755 142 431 1,352 513 747 4,242
... ...........................................................
SPECIaL RCMIT
Reenues 5,726 10,612 9,660 15,046 13,855 14,931 69,930
Expenditures 4,990 0,929 9,186 13,963 11,097 12,097 61,263
Deficit/Surplus 736 683 474 1,083 2,750 2,833 8,560
.......................................................................................................
Revenms 13,567 22,765 22,362 31,398 28,429 30,456 148,976
Expenditures 12,076 21,640 21,iS4 28,94 25,157 26,875 136,166
Capital Forration 1,899 10,751 7,558 13,215 9,721 10,385 56,357
Deficit/Surplus 1,490 1,125 900 2,134 3,271 3,681 12,810
Share ofCaital
fornation 40.62 49.71 35.2U 45.61 38.61 38.6? 41.42
Suc: MoM Loal out, finance Y.9. (1991-85) and fluncipl Y.8. (1986) 14-Jun-U
Nbte: a. 1985 nral Account Capil forration estimated using 198t ages.
b. CoWbined capital fornation estimted using neral Account aerges for the Special Account.
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KORE
SECOID W1RN16JU REGIMNRL PROJECT
PROIECT COIPLETI0N REPORT
Yeosu City finances
(in w nillion)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Totl
GEERAL ICCOUNT
Revnues 5,698 8,412 8,568 9,3t9 9,15 12,267 53,719
Ependitures 5,312 7,291 7,887 8,523 8,341 11,241 48,598
Capital fWrnation 2,195 3,016 2,821 2,674 2,166 2,919 15,791
Oeficit/Srplus 385 1,118 682 826 1,084 1,026 5,121
.. .............................. . ... .. ... .. . .... ...... .. ...... ... ...
SPECIL AECCEIM
Reveue 3,739 6,580 9,150 ?,022 7,482 9,130 43,102
Expenditues 3,484 6,065 7,890 5,773 6,091 6,524 35,626
OeficitdSurplus 255 515 1,260 1,249 1,391 2,606 7,276
........................................................................................................
cOEnE
Revenues 9,437 14,991 17,718 16,371 16,907 21,397 56,821
Ependitures 8,796 13,358 15,776 14,296 14,432 17,765 84,424
Capital feration 3,635 5,524 5,643 4,485 3,798 4,613 27,432
Oeficit/Surplus 640 1,633 1,942 2,075 2,474 3,632 12,397
Share ofCapitdl
fontion 41.31 11.31 35,8A 31.41 26.0? 26.0? 32.5?
Souce: MMNA Local ou. finance Y8.i (1561-85) and Ilunicipal Y.8. (1986) 14-Jun-68
Note: a. 1885 6eneral Account Ci al fornation estiated using 1984 aerages.
b. Conbined capital fornation estiated using Genral Rccount arages for the Special Account,
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MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER
Oct. 12, 1089
Mr. Alex&nder Nowicki
Division Chief
Operations Evaluation Dept.
World Bank
Dear Mr. Nowicki :
Re : Korea - Second Gwangju Regional Project
(Ln. 1758 - Ko)
Opinion on Project Coitpletion Report
----------------------------------------------------
I appreciate your positive cooperation in completing
the Second Gwangju Regional PrQject.
I hope that the following opinion will be added to
your report
Following
o Where to be added
* 11, B , 2. 3, ( b) Design Standards for Housing Estatis
o Opinion to be added
After expandable core houses of 9 pyong, about 30isq. m,
and 12 pyong, about 40 squk.,were sold to the low
42 - ANNE 10
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income group, most of occupants expanded their
houses into more than 13 pyong, about 43 sj,~m,
past one or two years since they felt inconvenient
in living there owing to the small size.
Truly yours
Gil - Dae
Director
Regional Planning Division
Ministry of Construction
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X-R RE:GIONAL CONSTRUTxION OIFjC:
MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA
I-RI JEONRABUGDO KOREA
TEL I-R 52 - 1233
Ref . Jikae - 30500 - Au gy. 29. 1989.
To Axexander, Nowicki
Division Chief, Cperations
Evaluation Dept, I B R D.
Re : Reply to Project (mupletion Report, Second Gwangju Regional Project
(tn. 1758 - ND)
We have the pleasure of thanks for your positive cooperation in
implementation of above project.
We have no object about above project, which you prepared othert than
followings.
fbllowings
S. For J[ B. 2.3, (b) Design Standards For Hcusing Estates..
Actual the Governrment idea was diffrent with the Banks thugh, 9 PY
and 12 PY were decided and performed, and most of them were unconvenient to
live, therefore they extended to 13 IVY or more within one or two years.
Therefore, it made proof of that the original Government idea wes right.
Truly yours
Dit sik
Director, I R C O
